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ENCOURAGING LITIGATION: WHY 
DODD-FRANK GOES TOO FAR IN 
ELIMINATING THE PROCEDURAL 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, widely touted as “the Great 
Recession,”1 the government and public have struggled to identify a proper 
solution in order to prevent another catastrophic hit to the national 
economy.  One of the most difficult aspects of this endeavor has been 
understanding the sophisticated and exotic investment schemes that 
contributed to this crisis.  Investment products such as credit default swaps, 
collateralized debt obligations, and other derivatives were poorly 
understood and, despite their exponential growth in the years leading up to 
the crisis, were poorly regulated.2  As such, a national financial crisis 
spanned borders, highlighting the weakness of an interconnected global 
economy composed of financial instruments beyond the understanding of 
many investors and regulators. 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a recent response to this crisis.  The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), 
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010, institutes many 
changes to the way the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”) 
regulates the banking and financial services industries.3  The legislation 
creates a council of regulators to monitor economic risks, creates a new 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
 1. Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Finding a Cure: Post-Crisis Regulation 
of Financial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1299, 1300 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Keir D. Gumbs, Covington Burlington, LLP Client Advisory: Dodd Frank Beefs Up SEC and 
CFTC Enforcement, 1855 PLI/Corp 413, 415 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 
27014, 2010). 
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agency to regulate consumer financial products, and sets new standards for 
trading derivatives.4  Further, Dodd-Frank includes whistle-blower 
protections, shareholder approvals of golden parachute payments and say-
on-pay votes, disclosures of hedging and leadership structures, and 
compensation disclosure requirements.5  Proponents of Dodd-Frank 
promise that it will reduce the chances of another crisis and allow 
regulators to better handle one, should it arrive.6  They further tout its 
capacity to restore investor confidence, protect consumers and encourage 
economic growth.7  In contrast, opponents lament that Dodd-Frank “is a 
2,300-page legislative monster . . . that expands the scope and the powers 
of ineffective bureaucracies.”8 
Whatever the public’s estimation of Dodd-Frank as a whole, one 
section in particular is the subject of hot debate.  The sweeping whistle-
blower protections included in Dodd-Frank have garnered significant 
attention, particularly because they dramatically decrease the barriers and 
increase the incentives for corporate whistle-blowers.9  Specifically, Dodd-
Frank amends many provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to broaden both 
the class of individuals who may be considered whistle-blowers, as well as 
to include more employers and additional causes of action.  While many 
critics of Sarbanes-Oxley argue that it did not go far enough in protecting 
whistle-blowers, this article argues that Dodd-Frank has gone too far in 
eliminating the procedural difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley by drastically 
lowering the obstacles to filing claims, without providing safeguards 
against the inevitable onslaught of meritless or fraudulent claims.  
Furthermore, Dodd-Frank disincentivizes transparency as a means of self-
regulation, thus placing even more responsibility for regulating financial 
markets in the hands of a resource-strapped agency that may not be 
equipped to identify, understand and address problems in a timely manner. 
The first part of this article will identify the specific whistle-blower 
protections included in Dodd-Frank, followed by a comparison to previous 
rules under Sarbanes-Oxley, and conclude that Dodd-Frank skews the 
incentive structure such that the SEC will surely face an onslaught of false 
or meritless claims.  Next, self-regulation as an effective means of market 
regulation along with government oversight will be discussed.  This 
discussion will highlight another shortcoming of Dodd-Frank, insofar as it 
 
 4. Damian Palette & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Political Landscape, WALL ST. J., July 
16, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046826045753690300 
61839958.html. 
 5. Ryan J. Maierson, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: The General 
Counsel’s Quick Reference Guide, 1855 PLI/Corp 371, 374 (PLI Corp Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Ser. No. 27014, 2010). 
 6. Palette & Lucchetti, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Shelby (R., Ala.)). 
 9. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75. 
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discourages market transparency as a means of market regulation.  Finally, 
solutions to the problems inherent in Dodd-Frank will be offered, including 
repairing the whistle-blower incentive structure, encouraging transparency 
and internal corporate whistle-blower processes, and publicly prosecuting 
false claims to establish a clear no-tolerance policy. 
 
II.  EXPANDED WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTIONS 
UNDER DODD-FRANK 
 
As defined in Dodd-Frank, a whistle-blower includes any person or 
group providing any information that relates to any violation of securities 
law.10  Specifically, whistle-blowers may provide information pertaining to 
a violation of any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
criminal retaliation and violation of any other law, rule or regulation that is 
within the jurisdiction of the SEC.11  In addition, whistle-blowers may 
provide the SEC with reports of financial fraud by employees of a covered 
employer.12 
The class of whistle-blowers entitled to an award does not include 
employees of certain governmental or regulatory agencies, or those who 
were employed by such agencies when they obtained the information 
leading to their claims.13  In addition, employees convicted of a criminal 
violation related to the activities giving rise to their whistle-blowing claim 
are excluded, as are those who obtained the information giving rise to their 
claim in the course of an audit required under securities law and who could 
not lawfully submit information under § 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act.14  Finally, those who knowingly provide false information may not 
receive an award.15  These exclusions are narrow, however, and therefore 
one commentator has noted that “even an attorney who discloses the 
information in violation of the attorney/client privilege seems to be eligible 
to receive a bounty (unless such attorney can somehow be criminally 
convicted for this impropriety).”16 
Importantly, whistle-blowers must provide “original information” not 
known to the SEC, and not “exclusively derived” from an allegation made 
in an official hearing, government report, audit, investigation, or from the 
 
 10. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Esta E. Stecher, Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions: Dodd-Frank Act Contains Several 
New and Expanded Whistleblower Provisions, Including Mandatory Rewards, Publications, 1849 
PLI/Corp 861, 864 (PLI Corp Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 24008, 2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. John C. Coffee, Jr., New York Law Journal—Hidden Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act, 1849 
PLI/Corp 871, 874 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 24008, 2010). 
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media.17  Increasing the scope of Dodd-Frank, information supplied by a 
whistle-blower may be related to securities violations that occurred either 
before or after the passage of Dodd-Frank.18  Where the information 
provided by a whistle-blower is insufficient to lead to “successful 
enforcement” of an action, however, the SEC may refuse to pay out a 
bounty.19  If the SEC makes a minimal award or no award at all, the 
whistle-blower may appeal the SEC’s decision to a court of appeals.20 
Retaliation against a whistle-blower is explicitly forbidden in Dodd-
Frank.21  Employers may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 
[or otherwise] discriminate against the whistle-blower in the terms and 
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistle-
blower” in providing the SEC with information, or initiating or testifying in 
an SEC investigation or judicial administrative action based upon this 
information, or for making disclosures protected under Sarbanes-Oxley.22 
Whistle-blowers alleging retaliation may sue in federal district court, 
and relief may include reinstatement of prior seniority, double back pay 
with interest, and compensation for litigation costs including expert 
witnesses and reasonable attorneys’ fees.23  Notably, the burden of proof 
for whistle-blowers alleging a prima facie case of retaliation is significantly 
lower under Dodd-Frank than under other federal anti-retaliation statutes.24  
Whereas in other federal laws employees must show that the protected 
conduct—that is, the conduct they allege served as a basis for their 
employer’s retaliation—was a determining or significant factor in the 
retaliation, under Dodd-Frank employees need only show that the protected 
conduct was a contributing factor.25  To defeat this claim, an employer 
must then provide clear and convincing evidence that they would have 
taken the same action were it not for the employee’s protected conduct.26 
Claims of retaliation must be brought within six years after the 
retaliation, or within three years after facts material to the right of action 
were or should have been discovered, but in any case within ten years after 
the retaliation.27  Sarbanes-Oxley claims must be brought within 180 days 
 
 17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 
922, 124 Stat 1376, 1841–42 (2010). 
 18. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75. 
 19. Coffee, supra note 16, at 875. 
 20. Id.  (noting that this ability to appeal could result in the SEC’s litigation docket containing a 
new class of bounty denials and appeals cases). 
 21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §748. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374–75; Miranda Tolar, Whistleblowers in the Corporate Context: 
And Employer’s Perspective, ASPATORE, Nov. 2010, at *4, available at 2010 WL 4774893. 
 24. Expansion of Whistleblower Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act, COOLEY LLP (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.cooley.com/expansion-of-whistleblower-protection-the-dodd-frank-act. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §922. 
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of the date on which the violation occurred, or the date when the whistle-
blower learned of the action.28 
Dodd-Frank amends the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to provide a mandatory reward for those whistle-
blowers that bring original information and meet the other requirements as 
set forth in Dodd-Frank.29  Whistle-blowers may recover an amount 
between ten percent and thirty percent of the total monetary sanctions 
imposed under Dodd-Frank.30  When determining the amount of an award, 
the SEC may consider the significance of the information provided by the 
whistle-blower, the degree of assistance by the whistle-blower and his or 
her legal representative, and the interests of the SEC in deterrence by 
making an award to the whistle-blower.31  However, a whistle-blower must 
reveal his or her identity in order to collect the award.32 
Dodd-Frank provides funding for whistle-blower awards by 
establishing a Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Protection 
Fund and a Commodity Futures Trading Commission Customer Protection 
Fund in the U.S. Treasury.33  These funds will be partially funded by some 
of the monetary penalties brought under the securities laws.34 
 
III.  A DEPARTURE FROM SARBANES-OXLEY 
 
Prior to Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley set forth the rules for reporting 
information regarding financial fraud, including protections for whistle-
blowers.  Passed in 2002 in reaction to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, 
Sarbanes-Oxley set forth unprecedented anti-retaliation protections for 
whistle-blowers and was lauded as one of the “most protective anti-
retaliation provisions in the world.”35  Despite its celebrated passage, 
however, in the first three years only 3.6% of whistle-blowers were 
successful in their claims under the act, and on appeal, only 6.5% of 
whistle-blowers were successful.36  Scholars have attributed this low 
success rate in part to a strict application of procedural and statutory 
requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley that resulted in most cases failing to 
 
 28. Esta E. Stecher, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP—Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions: Dodd-
Frank Act Contains Several New and Expanded Whistleblower Provisions, Including Mandatory 
Rewards, Publications, 1849 PLI/Corp 861, 865 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 
24008, 2010). 
 29. Stecher, supra note 28, at 864. 
 30. Maierson, supra note 9, at 374. 
 31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §922. 
 32. Maierson, supra note 9, at 375. 
 33. Stecher, supra note 28, at 864. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007). 
 36. Moberly, supra note 35, at 65. 
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meet the legal standards of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim and thus never reaching 
a determination of the facts on the merits.37  Indeed, 66.7% of cases brought 
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) were 
rejected, and 95.2% of the cases appealed to administrative law judges 
were rejected.38  Some of these procedural and statutory requirements are 
discussed below. 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistle-blowers included only those 
employees providing information regarding financial fraud.39 In these 
cases, whistle-blowers reported violations to the OSHA, and Department of 
Labor processes were used in retaliation cases.40 
Whistle-blowers could only bring retaliation claims against publicly 
traded companies.  In order to bring a successful suit, whistle-blowers 
working for private subsidiaries of public companies had to prove that the 
subsidiary was either an alter ego of the publicly traded parent company, or 
an agent of that company.41 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistle-blowers alleging retaliation first filed 
complaints with OSHA, which then conducted an investigation and issued 
preliminary orders.42  A complaint was required to be filed with OSHA 
within ninety days of the date on which the violation occurred.43  Not 
surprisingly, this short filing requirement eliminated many whistle-blower 
claims; according to one study, in 2006, fifteen percent of the Sarbanes-
Oxley whistle-blower claims were dismissed for failure to file a timely 
claim.44  Another scholar suggests that the failure rate for claims brought to 
the OSHA based solely on the statute of limitations was eighteen percent, 
and as high as one-third for cases brought to administrative law judges.45 
In the event that either party objected to the results of the OSHA 
investigation and orders, an administrative judge within the Department of 
Labor conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued an appealable 
decision.46  In the case of an appeal to the Department of Labor’s 
Administrative Review Board, if the board failed to issue a final decision 
within 180 days of filing the complaint, the whistle-blower could bring an 
action in federal court, where it would be reviewed de novo.47 
The Dodd-Frank amendments mark a significant departure from the 
 
 37. Moberly, supra note 35, at 71. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Maierson, supra note 9, at 374. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010). 
 44. Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 241, 251 (2009). 
 45. Moberly, supra note 35, at 72. 
 46. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2. 
 47. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2. 
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original Sarbanes-Oxley rules in several respects.  First, unlike Sarbanes-
Oxley, Dodd-Frank covers both public companies and subsidiaries or 
affiliates whose financial information is included in its financial 
statements.48  This effectively encompasses most subsidiaries and affiliates 
of public companies.49  Dodd-Frank also protects employees of nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations.50 
Second, while it was unclear whether Sarbanes-Oxley suits in federal 
court were entitled to a jury, under Dodd-Frank, litigants have the express 
right to a jury trial.51  This is particularly significant because juries are often 
skeptical about employers in whistle-blower cases, and because these suits 
often involve complicated financial transactions that may be difficult to 
explain to a jury.52  Therefore the right to a jury trial will likely prove 
advantageous to whistle-blowers under Dodd-Frank. 
Third, Dodd-Frank likely renders arbitration agreements of Sarbanes-
Oxley claims unenforceable.  Specifically, Dodd-Frank states that “[n]o 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the 
agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”53  In 
addition, Dodd-Frank most likely nullifies any post-termination waivers of 
Sarbanes-Oxley claims.54  This means that if an employee signed an 
agreement not to file a Sarbanes-Oxley claim upon termination of 
employment, that agreement will not be enforced. 
Finally, whistle-blowers who win retaliation claims are entitled to 
double back pay with interest under Dodd-Frank, as opposed to merely 
back pay under Sarbanes-Oxley.55  Dodd-Frank also explicitly provides for 
reinstatement with seniority,56 whereas under Sarbanes-Oxley whistle-
blowers were not always reinstated even after a court order.57  In fact, the 
Second Circuit ruled that courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce preliminary 
orders of reinstatement under Sarbanes-Oxley.58  Thus, employees who 
were formerly only entitled to back pay after wrongful termination under 
Sarbanes-Oxley may now receive double back pay as well as reinstatement 
to their previous position of seniority under Dodd-Frank. 
 
 
 48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §929A. 
 49. Tolar, supra note 23, at 2. 
 50. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(b). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Tolar, supra note 23, at 13. 
 53. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(c). 
 54. Tolar, supra note 23, at 3. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
 56. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(a). 
 57. Jisoo Kim, Comment, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need To Reform the Whistleblower 
Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 242–43; 254–55; 259; 262–63 
(2009). 
 58. Kim, supra note 57, at 262. 
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IV.  AN INVITATION TO FILE FALSE AND MERITLESS CLAIMS 
 
The myriad of expanded provisions under Dodd-Frank create a 
skewed incentive system for whistle-blowers.  Barriers to filing claims 
have been drastically reduced.  The statute of limitations has been extended 
from a mere ninety days under Sarbanes-Oxley to 180 days,59 or in the case 
of retaliation, between three and six years for employers protected by the 
SEA under Dodd-Frank.60  The class of whistle-blowers has been 
expanded, as have the types of companies within the scope of Dodd-Frank.  
Now, nearly any whistle-blower reporting any securities violation61 against 
a broad range of public or private companies62 will be covered by Dodd-
Frank.  Additionally, the burden of proof has been lowered for establishing 
a prima facie case of retaliation.  Employees now need only show that the 
protected action was a contributing factor, rather than a determining or 
significant, factor, leading to the unfavorable personnel action giving rise 
to their claim.63  Combined, these new rules reduce the likelihood that a 
whistle-blower’s claim will be thrown out for failure to comply with the 
statutory formalities of Dodd-Frank.  Employees are more likely to fall 
within the temporal statutory formalities with the longer statute of 
limitations.  Employees are also more likely to have the requisite amount of 
proof in any retaliation complaints under Dodd-Frank because they no 
longer need to show anything near causation.  Furthermore, for employers 
to defeat such retaliation claims, they must provide clear and convincing 
evidence that they would have acted the same way towards the employee in 
the absence of the protected conduct.64  This provides additional protection 
for whistle-blowers because the clear and convincing standard is higher 
than the previous requirement of merely articulating a legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason for conducting the personnel action.65 
After whistle-blower claims survive the more lenient procedural and 
statutory requirements of Dodd-Frank, they are also likely to face more 
favorable treatment in trial.  Under Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley claims are 
now entitled to jury trials in federal court with large monetary awards at 
stake, thus increasing the likelihood that whistle-blowers who might not 
otherwise be able to afford counsel will be able to obtain an attorney on a 
contingent fee basis to aggressively litigate their claims.66  Indeed, 
 
 59. Stecher, supra note 13, at 866. 
 60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010). 
 61. Maierson, supra note 5, at 373. 
 62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922(a). 
 63. See Expansion of Whistleblower Protection, supra note 24. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Expansion of Whistleblower Protection, supra note 24. 
 66. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922; 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(b)(2)(E). 
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commentators have predicted that more plaintiffs’ attorneys will enter the 
field, drawn by the potentially staggering cash bounties.67  They may even 
begin soliciting whistle-blowers who otherwise might not have considered 
filing a claim.68  Further, contingency fee agreements might face lax 
regulation; firms could enter into a one-third contingency agreement with a 
would-be whistle-blower, and unlike fee awards in class action cases, 
judicial approval is not required for this fee.69 
Jury trials are also likely to lead to more favorable results for whistle-
blowers, as juries are generally suspicious of employers in whistle-blower 
cases.70  This combination of competent legal counsel and sympathetic 
juries is likely to result in a significant increase in the number of successful 
whistle-blower claims, particularly when compared to the low success rate 
of Sarbanes-Oxley claims.71 
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank provides strong incentives to bypass 
internal corporate regulatory measures and instead engage in a profit-
seeking race.  Successful whistle-blowers are entitled to a large chunk of 
the penalty levied against an employer, between ten percent and thirty 
percent.72  Legal commentators have opined that this payout is “too 
much.”73  Indeed, given that SEC actions sometimes settle for between 
$100 million and $800 million, and that corporate defendants often settle 
with the SEC, even ten percent of the penalty is extraordinarily large.74  
Because whistle-blowers must provide original information not previously 
reported to the SEC, they are likely to rush to the SEC before utilizing 
internal corporate remedies in order to ensure that they are the first to 
provide the information.75  If employees brought their concerns to internal 
counsel before the SEC, they would run the risk that their employers would 
report the claims to the SEC first, to ensure that the employee could not 
provide original information to the SEC. 
The assistance of counsel may help weed out some meritless claims, 
but this incentive structure nonetheless provides little penalty for filing a 
weak claim on the off chance that it is successful.  Attorneys are likely to 
build stronger cases by supplementing the whistle-blower’s testimony with 
other evidence.76  The SEC, an already resource-strapped agency,77 is thus 
 
 67. Coffee, supra note 16, at 874. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 874. 
 70. See Tolar, supra note 23, at 13. 
 71. Moberly, supra note 35, at 94–95. 
 72. Maierson, supra note 5, at 374. 
 73. Christopher Wiener, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and Recommendations, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 531, 556 (2010). 
 74. Coffee, supra note 16, at 873. 
 75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922. 
 76. Coffee, supra note 16, at 874. 
 77. Jim Puzzanghera, SEC Chief Warns Against Budget Cuts, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, 
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setting itself up to be inundated with both false and meritless claims 
brought by whistle-blowers seeking little more than a huge monetary 
payout.  While Dodd-Frank includes an allocation of penalty fines to 
finance the prosecution of cases and payouts to whistle-blowers, it is 
unclear how it will be able to efficiently resolve a substantial number of 
cases if much of its time is wasted on empty claims. 
These factors add up to create a strong incentive for whistle-blowers 
to attempt to file weak and meritless claims.  Dodd-Frank cautions that 
whistle-blowers bringing false claims will not be entitled to a monetary 
award, but does not contain express language outlining a penalty for 
bringing such a claim.78  As a result, plaintiff’s law firms have been 
inundated with calls from would-be whistle-blowers eager to bring a claim 
and collect a bounty award, a trend that seems likely to continue.79  
Certainly law firms that accept cases on a contingent fee basis will weed 
out some weak claims, but it is likely that a large number of claims will 
still reach the SEC. 
 
V.  MARKET SELF-REGULATION AS A SUPPLEMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 
 
Many of the inherent problems in Dodd-Frank’s whistle-blower 
protections could be eliminated by scaling back the incentives for whistle-
blowers and instead providing strong market incentives for self-regulation 
as a supplement to government oversight. 
While Dodd-Frank creates a strong incentive for whistle-blowers to 
report perceived violations as quickly as possible, some critics argue that it 
still falls short of the inherent benefits of self-regulation, as opposed to 
direct government regulation under Dodd-Frank.  This is because, unlike 
the SEC, the financial industry can access, asses and react to market 
information quickly.  Particularly in complex financial markets, the ability 
to react to problems immediately is crucial, as opposed to waiting for a 
drawn-out SEC investigation.80  By discouraging whistle-blowers from 
alerting their employers to potential problems first, Dodd-Frank essentially 
ensures that problems will not be addressed immediately.  Further, some 
commentators suggest that direct government regulation of the financial 
sector is inefficient because it incorrectly allocates risk and, as a result, the 
 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/05/business/la-fi-sec-schapiro-20110205. 
 78. Stecher, supra note 13, at 864 (2010). 
 79. Maxwell Kennerly, The Idiot’s Guide Whistleblowing Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act, LITIGATION & TRIAL-THE LAW BLOG OF PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY MAX KENNERLY (Sept. 
10, 2010), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2010/09/articles/the-law/for-people/the-idiots-guide-
whistleblowing-under-the-doddfrank-wall-street-reform-act/. 
 80. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 670 (2010). 
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cost of capital increases.81  In this vein, it is argued that market forces alone 
can incentivize financial firms to act with “due diligence,” so long as those 
markets are efficient and transparent.82  Certainly self-regulation of 
financial markets has been problematic in recent years, but this does not 
mean that the concept cannot be applied in new ways. 
History has shown that market self-regulation can be extremely 
effective, and also that pure government oversight is rife with problems.  
Indeed, in so called “top-down, centralized” regulatory regimes, critics 
argue that the government has insufficient knowledge to identify root 
causes of problems, design solutions, implement rules, and motivate 
regulated industries to comply with rules.83  In this vein, the centralized 
SEC regulatory body under Dodd-Frank could have inherent problems by 
nature of being a “top-down” government regulatory body. 
Proponents of self-regulation also tout its potential to create a sense of 
ownership and participation in rule making, as well as to foster shared 
values and encourage voluntary compliance with rules made in accord with 
these values.84  When private industry is involved in rule making, it 
becomes a compromise that recognizes the unique circumstances facing 
each industry.  While, as skeptics are quick to point out, self-regulation can 
lead to collective action problems and even self-serving, illusory 
regulation,85 these characterizations ignore the potential for efficient, 
effective regulation by pairing self-regulation with government oversight. 
One example of effective self-regulation of markets is the disclosure-
based regulatory system found in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, passed 
by Congress in the wake of the Great Depression in order to regulate Wall 
Street.86  Mandatory disclosures and antifraud measures, such as § 10(b), 
were principle among the regulations in this act.87  Subsequent judicial 
interpretation of § 10(b) both narrowed the range of activities that fall 
within the scope of the regulatory power of that act and set a high burden of 
proof for private plaintiffs bringing claims under § 10(b).88  This narrow 
interpretation of § 10(b) reflects a disclosure-based regulatory system, the 
favored regulatory policy of the past several decades.89  The theory behind 
a disclosure-based system is that when investors have sufficient 
information about the firms in which they invest, they make rational 
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choices and markets function efficiently.90  This policy gives deference to 
individual choice and reduces government interference, suggesting that the 
best way to ensure that markets perform efficiently is to require firms to 
disclose financial data, not by encouraging an onslaught of private 
litigation by setting a low burden of proof for § 10(b) claims.91  In this way, 
markets self-regulate by voluntarily disclosing data to investors and the 
government, and the government regulates markets by mandating and 
enforcing the rule of public disclosure. 
Whereas the 1934 Securities Exchange Act set a high burden of proof 
for private litigants to decrease private litigation as a regulatory means and 
instead encourage transparency amongst financial firms, the Dodd-Frank 
Act encourages litigation as a means of regulation rather than inter-
organizational transparency.  By encouraging whistle-blowers to find and 
report fraud directly to the SEC, Dodd-Frank also encourages companies to 
decrease transparency in order to prevent whistle-blowers from discovering 
potentially harmful information.  As such, this ripple effect harms investors 
seeking information about the companies in which they invest, and the 
SEC’s ability to regulate the industry as a whole.  Further, because 
investors have less information about the companies in which they invest, 
their decisions cannot act as a means of regulation.  That is, their 
investment in or aversion to certain companies cannot determine the market 
value of those companies, and therefore market prices do not reflect the 
way informed, rational consumers would value those companies in an 
efficient, transparent market. 
In contrast, if the barriers to litigation were higher for whistle-blowers, 
firms would have greater incentive to be transparent and open with 
employees, thus encouraging them to report issues internally so that they 
could be resolved efficiently and effectively.  Further, transparency would 
increase the chances that the SEC would be privy to information about 
employers, and therefore decrease employees’ opportunities to provide the 
SEC with “original” information.92  Only after internal means of regulation 
were exhausted should whistle-blowers turn to litigation.  Transparency 
and internal remedies foster a better corporate culture and sense of 
confidence amongst employees and investors alike, rendering this means of 
self-regulation a favorable solution. 
Transparency has another important effect in self-regulation.  Unlike 
government agencies, sophisticated investors have a strong incentive and 
ability to analyze companies to identify potential risks and problems.  
Indeed, they are better equipped to access and analyze market data in real 
time, and to determine which issues pose significant threats to the industry 
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as a whole.93  Hedge funds and investment firms, for example, often have 
entire departments dedicated to researching the companies in which they 
invest.  These companies have significantly more resources than 
government investigators, and can prompt other companies to address 
problems by publishing reports and findings that discourage other investors 
from investing in a particular company and, in turn, encourage the 
company to address the problem or face real financial losses.  This is 
because intermediaries such as investment firms “rely on their reputation in 
attracting business.”94  By effectively encouraging companies to become 
less transparent, however, Dodd-Frank chips away at an important means 
of regulation. 
Dodd-Frank does take a step in the right direction by moving away 
from the OSHA regulatory mechanisms, as used by Sarbanes-Oxley, and 
instead utilizing the expertise of the SEC to investigate whistle-blower 
claims.  Unlike the SEC, the OSHA had little securities fraud experience 
and was therefore ill-equipped to delve into the complex world of financial 
markets.95  Nonetheless, the SEC simply lacks the resources to identify and 
respond to all cases of financial fraud in real time, particularly when 
compared to private firms and investors.  Its regulatory power should 
therefore be supplemented by some form of market self-regulation, such as 
transparency. 
 
VI.  CURBING FALSE CLAIMS 
 
Both the SEC and private employers will need to take deliberate steps 
to curb false claims.  As written, Dodd-Frank provides little disincentive 
for attempting to file a meritless claim because of the huge cash rewards at 
stake for a successful claim. 
Employers have several options to discourage employees from 
bypassing internal reporting mechanisms.  First, employers can improve 
internal reporting programs by adding cash bonuses.  These bonuses need 
not match the massive potential payouts of SEC claims because they will 
offer the distinct advantage of a quick payout without the pain of protracted 
litigation.  In addition, employers must ensure that managers can identify 
potential whistle-blower complaints to ensure either internal resolution or 
self-reporting to the SEC, before the employee goes directly to the SEC.96 
Further, employers can continue a practice instituted in response to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, whereby many employers require employees to annually 
certify that they were not aware of any wrongdoing regarding the 
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employer’s finances or financial reporting.97  This practice acts as a strong 
defense against false claims.  Nonetheless, in light of the probable 
unenforceability of arbitration and severance agreements under Dodd-
Frank, employers must carefully craft these certifications to ensure 
compliance with the rules.98 
In addition, it is imperative that employers implement strict anti-
retaliation policies.  This will help ensure that, should a whistle-blower 
bring a retaliation claim, they will not be able to prove the causal nexus 
element of a prima facie case of retaliation.99  It would also behoove 
employers to keep records of e-mails and other documents that might 
provide a lawful explanation for the alleged retaliation.100  This would 
allow employers to catch cases of retaliation internally and remedy them or 
report them to the SEC immediately.  In addition, it would reassure 
employees that retaliation claims were being taken seriously and institute a 
no-tolerance policy for retaliation against employees. 
Finally, the importance of creating a corporate culture that is friendly 
to internal whistle-blowing should not be understated.  The Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, which influenced the development and passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley,101 illuminated the problems with discouraging insiders 
from coming forward with information about misconduct.102  In 
Congressional hearings prior to the passage of that act, for example, an 
Enron whistle-blower testified about the intimidating nature of Enron 
executives, as well as the hostile environment that discouraged internal 
reporting.103  The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistle-blower protections 
was intended in part to overcome such hostile corporate environments by 
encouraging whistle-blowers to come forward.104  By ensuring that 
employees feel comfortable and safe discussing their concerns internally, 
however, employers can avoid the costs involved in defending against SEC 
investigations spurred by whistle-blower claims.  As always, any claims 
that could not be resolved internally could be self-reported to the SEC. 
The SEC must also work to reduce the number of false or meritless 
claims, particularly by publicly sanctioning whistle-blowers and attorneys 
that file claims with no objective possibility of success on the merits, to set 
a clear no-tolerance policy.  If Dodd-Frank itself does not provide 
disincentives for meritless claims, then the SEC must demonstrate that only 
serious claims will be tolerated.  This could also include collaboration with 
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state bar associations to penalize attorneys who knowingly file meritless or 
false claims with the SEC. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 As would-be whistle-blowers line up to file suits under Dodd-Frank, it 
will be crucial for the SEC to set some boundaries by penalizing those who 
knowingly file false claims, and by strictly adhering to the requirements 
that whistle-blowers provide original information.  The original 
information requirement is itself likely to preclude many claims, but should 
nonetheless be publicized to ensure that meritless claims are not filed at all. 
Furthermore, employers must create internal measures for employees 
to report perceived frauds and violations, and would be wise to create 
smaller bounties for employees who highlight real concerns within the 
company.  This will ensure that employees have more incentive to resolve 
their concerns internally, decrease the chance that they can provide the 
SEC with original information, and foster a better workplace environment. 
In addition, the SEC should consider supplementing its regulatory 
efforts with some form of market self-regulation. A disclosure-based 
system, for example, could be an effective way to increase transparency 
and foster efficient regulation. 
By addressing some of the shortcomings inherent in Dodd-Frank, and 
exploring alternative means of regulation, the SEC can incentivize and 
regulate an efficient financial market.  Particularly in the face of the recent 
financial crisis, efficient regulation is all the more important, and the 
government cannot afford to waste resources on defending against 
unnecessary litigation.  Therefore Dodd-Frank’s shortcomings with regards 
to whistle-blower incentives must be addressed to allow the SEC to 
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